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Posted by
Easy
on Sat Jan 26 01:43:01 2008, in response to LACMTA committee votes for subway barrier gates, posted by Easy on Thu Jan 17 23:20:38 2008.
edf40wrjww2msgDetail:detailStr fiogf49gjkf0d The former executive director of Metrolink, Richard Stanger, sent a letter to the LACMTA board that was strongly critical of the study that Metro's consultant prepared regarding the installation of barrier gates. He raised many of the same issues that other advocates have plus some new information. Evidently the barrier gates that metro wants to install are the "tripod turnstile" variety which are the easiest to evade. He calls them to task (like everyone else has) for their poor and misleading math statistics and even dismisses the Homeland Security issues as separate and irrelevant to the barrier system. His entire letter was posted on a blog.
For the time being metro has postponed their decision. Hopefully they do the right thing.
Comments on Metro’s Draft Faregating Analysis Report
Prepared by Richard Stanger
January 15, 2008
There are a number of misleading assumptions and incomplete cost analyses in this report that raise questions about its results. In essence, revenue loss through fare evasion has been estimated much higher than it is, and costs – both for equipment and for operations – are estimated much lower than they will be. Moreover, some basic assumptions about the benefits of gated entry/exit and the drawbacks of the proof-of-payment system are questionable.
Overall:
The November 15th staff report to several Metro board committees conveying the subject report starts with this phrase: “Los Angeles Metro remains the only non-barrier subway system in North America”. That statement is misleading. No other non-barrier subway system has ever existed in North America. There are reasons for this. The Los Angeles Metro is the only North American subway line designed and built after proof-of-payment fare systems were introduced into North America in the late 1970’s. The Los Angeles Metro is also the only subway line integrated with an extensive light rail and commuter rail system both of which rely on proof-of-payment fare collection. All new light rail systems in the United States and all new commuter rail systems in the United States use proof-of-payment fare collection because:
a) it is a very cost-efficient means of enforcing fares already proven in many rail systems throughout Western Europe,
b) it would be nearly impossible and too costly to enclose most light rail and commuter rail stations enough to have secure fare gates, and
c) no light rail nor commuter rail system anywhere that has implemented proof-of-payment fare enforcement has found it to be unworkable or even undesirable.
Given that all other Southern California rail systems use proof-of-payment fare enforcement, it is logical to employ it in the Red Line as well. Nevertheless, as the Board Report states, questions persist about the Red Line.
The report implies that a barrier system is needed to collect distance-based fares. This is not true; all new commuter rail systems in North America have distance-based fares as do many subway systems in Europe. In fact, the Blue Line fare equipment was specified to handle zone-based fares, but this fare structure was ultimately not implemented.
Cost of Fare Evasion:
Summary: The Faregating Analysis Report estimates the loss in revenues between MTA’s existing proof-of-payment system and a barrier fare enforcement system up to 10 times higher than it should be.
The TMD Report determined fare evasion rates for Metro’s rail lines. There is no reason to think these estimates are wrong. However, these rates are wrongly applied to revenues. On page 5, the Faregating Analysis states: “Fare evasion, currently estimated at approximately 6% of people inspected, results in revenue loss of approximately $5.6 million out of $40 million annual revenue.”
What the analysis has done is take Metro’s annual rail ridership and correctly multiplied it by 6%, then wrongly multiplied the result by the base $1.25 fare (74.3 million annual riders x 6% x $1.25 = $5.6 million). But the average Metro fare is not $1.25, but 60˘ (from the 2005 National Transit Database), and the estimated amount of revenue loss should be $2.67 million. But even using 60˘ may be a high estimate of fare lost because many fare evaders would not otherwise be riding, and therefore very little actual fare revenue has been lost. But for sure it is incorrect to assume all fare evaders would otherwise purchase Metro’s highest fare, one-at-a-time, for all their trips.
The Report correctly notes that even under a barrier system there is fare evasion. It estimates barrier fare evasion in barrier systems (from anecdotal evidence) to be 1%-2%. It then uses 1% in its calculation of “net” fare evasion. (My own estimate from previous work in just this area is that barrier fare evasion is more like 2%-4%). There are two reason using 1% is too low: a) the tripod gate, recommended by the Metro staff, is given 0 points in the “resistance to fare evasion” category, and b) the stations with these gates will normally be unmanned. If one assumes a fare evasion rate of 2% for fare gates, then the net fare evasion revenue loss becomes $1.78 million ($2.67 million - $0.89 million).
Finally, a fundamental part of any proof-of-payment system is the ability to get back lost revenue from cheaters who are caught and pay the fine. The idea is that the agency cannot check everyone, so the fine is set high enough that one person caught “pays for” many others not caught. For example, if the average fine collected is $50, then each fine “pays for” 80 fare evaders ($50/60˘) not caught. Barrier fare systems do not have this critical element. They have no fare inspectors, no fare citations, no fare evasion court enforcement, and no fine revenues. The Faregating Analysis report does not state what the annual total fine revenues are, but that amount should be counted as revenue.1 If only 1% of fare evaders (that is, 1% of the 6% of passengers who evade fares) are caught and an average fine of $30 is collected, the annual revenue from fines is $1.33 million, if 2% are caught, fine revenues equal fare evasion losses.
Add back the $1.33 million in fine revenues collected and the net loss of revenue becomes $0.45 million ($1.78 million - $1.33 million). This loss is one-tenth the $5.6 million the Report estimates!
Analysis of Fare Gates:
Summary: The analysis of fare gates excludes a fair comparison with the no-barrier system. The fare gate chosen is the worst of the gated alternatives and the one with the least resistance to fare evasion. The discussion of Homeland Security issues has nothing to do with the issue of fare gates and is therefore misleading.
The table on page 20 of the Faregating Analysis summarizes a review of fare gate options available. It is reproduced below, (chart was removed because it looked terrible after blogger.com had its way with it, if anyone wants to read it, email me at thedaymen@gmail.com)
Adding the existing proof-of-payment (no barrier) system to the table clearly shows its overall superiority. In every attribute but “security and resistance to fare evasion” the no barrier system is far superior to any other.
The Metro staff instructed the consultant to cost only the least expensive tripod turnstile system. One bi-parting leaf gate will have to be included in every entrance because of ADA and other requirements. Moreover, there are no add fare machines yet included in the estimate. It is not clear what a patron in the paid area is to do when he/she needs to add value to their ticket.
Finally, the Report has a lengthy description of security features thought to be needed for Homeland Security reasons. But none of these systems have anything to do with the fare gates being discussed; they cannot be added inside the gate housing and would have to be additional equipment. They can be added whether the fare system is barrier or no barrier.
Cost of Retrofitting Stations:
Summary: Costs to retrofit light rail station entrances appear low compared with Red Line work. Moreover, there are large cost benefits of eliminating subway station mezzanines needed primarily for fare collection.
The report includes an estimate of the cost of adding fare gates and rightly points out that existing Red Line stations have provisions for fare gates. It should be noted that the principle reason for the mezzanine level in these stations is for these fare gate arrays. A proof-of-payment system having no fare gates does not require a mezzanine level. If fare gates were not required, the entire station box could be raised 30-feet in future stations at a cost savings of at least 33%. This is not a trivial amount: stations account for 50% of the cost of a mile of subway all costs included (one station/mile), or $200 million each. Saving $67 million over 10 stations is almost $700 million!
The Report estimates the cost of retrofitting stations for fare gates. As noted, the 24 entrances on the Red Line have already been designed and built with fare gates in mind, and the necessary conduits are in place. This work is estimated to cost $16.5 million, or $700,000 per entrance. The cost estimate to retrofit 40 light rail entrances, that were not designed to accommodate fare gates and have no conduits properly located is $19 million, or $475,000 per entrance. This difference does not appear logical since so much more effort will be needed at light rail stations. I expect their costs will end up much higher than indicated.
Operating Costs:
Summary: There are three areas whose costs may have been underestimated: station attendants (up to $15.4 million), fare media (unknown but in the many millions of dollars), and on-going, adequate fare inspection (perhaps $3.5 million).
The biggest operating cost issue concerns the need for station attendants. The report states that “mobile station attendants are shared at the rate of one for every five stations”. It is not clear how this type of manning will work when response times could be as much as 20 minutes or more. More permanent station staffing may be necessary. Staffing of an entrance will require (at least) three shifts per week, or roughly $240,000 per year. For the 24 Red Line entrances only, the total is $5.8 million. The staffing cost for the 40 strategic light rail station entrances is an additional $9.6 million annually.
The cost of expensive fare media has been excluded from the cost analysis (page 4). However, it is clearly crucial. For example, the report notes (page 47) that limited-use smart cards, which could be the fare medium, will cost 20˘ each with an annual estimated cost of $8 million. Another alternative fare medium described is long-life plastic smart cards estimated to cost $5 each, the cost perhaps to be bourn by each rider. No cost estimate is given for these long-life cards in the report, but to get some feel for the amount, if the 74.3 million annual riders make an average of 100 trips with each such a card, the cost of these cards (to somebody) will be $3.7 million annually.
Finally, the Report states that the contract for “civilian” fare inspectors will be cancelled at an annual savings of $7.03 million. Instead, there will be fare inspectors on light rail lines and Metro’s mobile Security Force at gated stations. Somehow, the cost of inspecting all the light rail (and Orange) lines and adding mobile attendants on Red Line stations (Option 1) will drop to $1.4 million. This is 20% of the $7 million cost of inspecting all lines now. The report does not explain how this can be possible since the entire light rail network will still need fare inspection. If the same level of fare inspection continues on the light rail network, one could assume a $3.5 million cost because ridership on the Red Line approximately equals ridership on the light rail lines.
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