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GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher

Posted by WillD on Tue Oct 6 00:19:13 2009

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The bad news just keeps piling up for the Bush-era Constellation program. First the Augustine Committee seems to be on the verge of recommending the Ares I crew launch vehicle be deleted and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle be drastically reduced in scale, and now the GAO makes similar recommendations. NASA itself estimates at least half the program cost will go into developing the launcher just to put the crew capsule into low Earth orbit. They haven't even begun developing the Ares V and addressing its many and varied technical issues, which could result in the same cost overruns the Ares I witnessed.

Orlando Sentinal
NASA's Ares rife with problems, GAO saysCAPE CANAVERAL - Just as supporters are pressing hard on Capitol Hill to resist efforts to kill NASA's AresI rocket and Orion capsule, the investigative arm of Congress released a report saying that NASA has not made a convincing financial case — or even set a firm price — for the space shuttle's replacement.

"While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design challenges have been addressed," says a 31-page Government Accountability Office report released Friday.

And though NASA has said that the development costs of the rocket and capsule will total $35 billion, the GAO estimates they will end up costing as much as $49 billion of the total $97 billion for the Constellation back-to-the-moon program.

The report follows the recently released summary findings of a presidential panel that suggested NASA scrap the Ares I if it wants to continue using the International Space Station and still have a viable human space program, declaring that there is not enough money to do both.

The panel said NASA needed at least $3 billion a year more, on top of its $18 billion budget, to finance a manned space program. Even then, it said, the agency might be better off using commercial rockets rather than Ares I to get to the space station.

President Barack Obama will decide on America's space-exploration strategy after he receives the final report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee next week.

In a three-page response, NASA Deputy Administrator Lori Garver told the GAO that the agency agrees that it needs to develop a better "business case" for the program. But she also seemed to hold out the possibility the program could be killed.

"The agency is working toward closing knowledge gaps about the Constellation program requirements, technologies, funding, schedule and other resources," she wrote, "so that it can be positioned to succeed when decisions are made to commit to significant, long-term investments" in the program.

Some members of Congress, especially on the House Science and Technology Committee, are urging the White House to stay the Constellation course.

Both U.S. Rep. Bart Gordon, D-Tenn., who chairs the House Science and Technology Committee, and his space-subcommittee chair, Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., said the GAO report underscored NASA's need for money.

"The choice is clear: either we give the Constellation program the funding it needs ... or we let our lack of commitment fritter away all that has been accomplished to date," Giffords said in a statement.

However, U.S. Rep. Suzanne Kosmas, D- New Smyrna Beach, acknowledged that "it is clear that there are concerns about the Constellation program that must be fully investigated and addressed." She added she's "confident" the problems can be overcome "with adequate resources."

But the GAO report said problems with Constellation involve more than money. The bleak audit, which ran from last December to last month, depicted a program dogged by technical woes, poor planning and questionable management decisions.

For instance, the report said that because the program's risk-management system warned that Ares I might not be able to meet its March 2015 maiden launch date to the space station, NASA managers stopped work on systems the program would need to go to the moon. Instead, they focused on building a rocket and capsule suited only to ferrying astronauts to the space station — a move many engineers say results in a very expensive trip to low Earth orbit.

NASA said it wanted to ensure Ares I would make its March 2015 date, adding that it could put back the systems needed for the moon later when more money became available. Even so, the GAO found, "these actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that [2015] deadline."

It said the biggest issue facing Constellation was the lack of a "sound business case" — a showing that the program will accomplish its goals at a cost that's understood and agreed upon.

"Progress has been made," the report said. "However, technical and design challenges are still significant, and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program."

As evidence, the report cited NASA's Integrated Risk Management Application, or IRMA, which is how the agency tracks technical challenges. "As of June 9, 2009," it said, "IRMA was tracking 464 risks for Ares I and Orion."

Of these, over 200 were listed as "high" risks — nearly double the total identified by the previous GAO audit in April 2008. Each could have "major effects on system cost, schedule, performance, or safety," the GAO said.

The risks include:

•Ongoing concerns about the rocket violently shaking during its ascent to orbit and uncertainty over whether a proposed system of shock absorbers to counteract the vibrations will work.

•Concerns about design of a second-stage fuel tank, which calls for a bulkhead to separate liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen fuel within the same tank.

•Difficulties in developing a launch-abort system powerful enough to pull the Orion capsule away from the speeding Ares rocket in an emergency.

But the report's main criticism was saved for the financial management of the program. The GAO said it found the cost of Constellation's developmental contracts have risen from $7.2 billion in 2007 to $10.2 billion in June 2009 as NASA sought to resolve technical and design challenges.

In some cases, auditors found that NASA authorized contractors to begin work before reaching final agreement on contract terms. Such work is called "undefinitized."

"By allowing undefinitized contract actions to continue for extended periods, NASA loses its ability to monitor contractor performance" or project remaining costs, the report said. One such contract was allowed to drag on like this for 13 months.
This other op/ed piece on the subject from The Space Review is fairly interesting, but IMHO the author's focus on commercial ISS servicing misses the mark. We'll see if SpaceX can get the Falcon 9 to go the right way sometime after November 29th, but before then (not to mention before a Dragon mission) it seems slightly premature to design NASA's post-Shuttle LEO architecture around that system. The Falcon 9H is almost as marginal to boost the Orion capsule as the Ares I, and the same is true of the proposed Delta IVH and proposed Atlas V modifications.

Meanwhile with the directly Shuttle Derived Heavy Lifters, the Not Shuttle-C shuttle modification is gaining ground on the program of record. Unfortunately questions remain about safety, the viability of the early payload shroud jettisoning, and the development of the cargo carrier which could make it extremely difficult complete the project within the budget targets. The Direct architecture is now in its fourth revision, with the SSMEs clustered in the first stage. They are also now illustrating a variant of the launcher with an enormous 12 meter by 37 meter payload fairing. It's unlikely any such fairing would ever be used, but it illustrates the distinct advantage of an inline cryogenic booster over the side-mount and the LOX/RP-1 based Ares V. The former cannot accomodate so large a protrusion from the center of thrust, and the latter is constrained by its lower density fuel requiring a larger core which leaves less space below the VAB door for rollout.

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Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher

Posted by JohnL on Tue Oct 6 20:56:19 2009, in response to GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher, posted by WillD on Tue Oct 6 00:19:13 2009.

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You seem to be more abreast with the technology than I am. However, from my reading, I get the impression that the current Ares program is primarily designed to keep ATK in business making solid fuel boosters.

I like the DIRECT idea. However, I would modify it by swapping as far as possible the SSMEs for RS-68s. The SSMEs are expensive, but they are reused. None of the DIRECT hardware is, so cheaper, one-use only parts should be substituted.

One thing I don’t understand, and I have never seen any references, is what does it take to human rate a launch vehicle? I have seen many articles citing the cost of uprating the Atlas/Titan/Centaur vehicles, but no-one seems to know what it entails.



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Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher

Posted by Olog-hai on Tue Oct 6 23:24:08 2009, in response to Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher, posted by JohnL on Tue Oct 6 20:56:19 2009.

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Sounds like he's a cheerleader for EADS.

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Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher

Posted by WillD on Wed Oct 7 00:18:10 2009, in response to Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher, posted by JohnL on Tue Oct 6 20:56:19 2009.

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I get the impression that the current Ares program is primarily designed to keep ATK in business making solid fuel boosters.

Hit the nail on the head. It was basically a 10 billion dollar handout to Alliant Tech, partly because Orrin Hatch needed some pork, and partly because ATK only other real product is fuel for missiles. The Shuttle program's insatiable need for large quantities of aluminum perchlorate creates an enormous economy of scale for the DoD's weapons programs. The Ares V is even more pork, with very large contracts about to be let to Rocketdyne for RS-68R engine development and the Marshall Spaceflight Center's 10 meter core development project. We haven't even started talking about the Altair lunar lander, yet are facing the prospect that the entire budget will be consumed by the launch vehicles and capsule alone.

I like the DIRECT idea. However, I would modify it by swapping as far as possible the SSMEs for RS-68s. The SSMEs are expensive, but they are reused. None of the DIRECT hardware is, so cheaper, one-use only parts should be substituted.

The second iteration of the Direct launch vehicles (then called Ares II and III) included 2 and 3 RS-68 engines. Unfortunately in NASA's estimation the ablative design of the RS-68 would not stand up to the heating produced on the bottom of the first stage by the solid rocket boosters. The RS-68 is actually a more powerful engine than the SSME, but it sacrifices a bit of controllability and specific impulse for its lower cost and simplicity. The ablative nature of the RS-68 is the biggest stumbling block, with the rocket nozzle designed to slowly erode over the course of the flight. On the bottom of a Delta 4 rocket this isn't a problem because its a far more benign environment than being next to an SRB, which would erode it from the out while the RS-68 erodes itself from the inside. The SSME circulates liquid hydrogen through the exhaust bell throughout flight and is thus a regeneratively cooled engine immune to base heating problems. A regeneratively cooled RS-68 has been proposed, but it nearly amounts to a new rocket design. As yet NASA has not bothered to address the potential base heating problems of the Ares V, which should be far more severe than either of the Jupiter variants, with 5 or 6 RS-68s and two 5.5 segment SRBs clustered in the bottom.

So far both the Direct advocates and advocates of the "Not Shuttle C" side-mount cargo carrier model are touting the fact that we'll have 17 SSMEs ready for flight after the Shuttle program ends. However, with both models eating through 3 or 4 every flight, that's only enough for 3 flights at most. The cost of an SSME is roughly 35 million dollars, while an RS-68 comes in at about 25 million dollars. Direct and NSC proponents claim that the Space Transportation Main Engine, a greatly simplified, cheaper LOX/LH2 engine based on the SSME, would cost less than 30 million dollars a pop and save time and money relative to developing a regenerative RS-68 engine. I suggested they investigate a drop-capsule to recover the rocket engines, something proposed for future Saturn V rockets that never developed, but was told that the cost of development would only be mitigated if they planned to fly on a nearly weekly basis.

One thing I don’t understand, and I have never seen any references, is what does it take to human rate a launch vehicle? I have seen many articles citing the cost of uprating the Atlas/Titan/Centaur vehicles, but no-one seems to know what it entails.

There are a huge number of things that go into it and I'm not sure of all of them. However, Air and Space magazine ran a piece on the man-rating of the SpaceX Falcon9/Dragon, and the Ares I/Orion not too long back. According to the article I believe the primary factor with respect to the launch vehicle man rating is both the probability of loss of crew and the probability of loss of mission, along with the path taken into orbit. The Shuttle stack gets a bit of a ding in the probability of loss of crew category because of the Challenger disaster. SpaceX's Falcon 9 achieves low LOC/LOM probability numbers through redundancy, with 9 engines in the first stage, any one of which can fail without scrubbing a mission. OTOH the Ares I's LOC/LOM probability is centered around supposedly proven hardware (although the J-2, having not flown for nearly 30 years, is hardly proven, especially after what they did to it to get the J-2X).

LOC/LOM numbers can be reduced through modification of the path into orbit. Both the Orion and Dragon capsules are designed with an offset center of gravity, like the Apollo capsule. This allows them some control over pitch and yaw during reentry. Thus they become in essence very poor lifting body craft during reentry, and that allows them to remain in the thin upper atmosphere bleeding off speed more slowly than if they were to reenter with a purely ballistic trajectory. G loads are not supposed to top 7 times earth's gravity on reentry with a lofted reentry, while a pure ballistic reentry could top 20 Gs. This is important to the launch vehicle's performance because were an abort to occur late in the flight it could mean the difference between life and death.

The flight profile of both the Falcon 9 (when mated with the Dragon capsule), and the Ares I is designed to impart horizontal velocity early in the flight. Its much more efficient to rise above the atmosphere vertically, then pitch down and gain orbital velocity where there's less friction. However, if something goes wrong with the launch vehicle right around that pitch down maneuver the astonauts aren't going to be able to utilize the capsule's lifting capabilities to slow their descent. Instead they're going to drop like a rock for 40 some odd miles before they hit meaningful atmosphere and then they're going to encounter a sustained 15+Gs. Thus both the Ares I and Falcon 9 are designed to give their occupants a fighting chance at survival by letting the capsule act as it would on a normal reentry.

The Atlas and Delta (the Titan has been eliminated, and the Centaur is an upper stage used on both the Atlas and Delta) are currently incapable of putting an Orion capsule into orbit with the flight profile that allows crew abort survival. United Launch Alliance is now claiming that an uprated RS-68 in the Delta IV, or the currently shelved Atlas 5H would allow them to get an Orion into orbit along the prefered flight profile. They also say that with a number of launches and an Advanced Centaur upper stage, they could do the moon return program at much lower cost than the Constellation program. A lot of their material shows a multi-core heavy launcher, but their documentation indicates that this would be in the 75 metric ton to LEO range (roughly the same as the Jupiter 130, the smaller of the two), and would be in the "After 2025" timeframe, well after even the Ares V could be flying.

It seems that the Augustine Committee is leaning heavily toward that option as "Commercial space launch". Something unsurprising when one considers that Mr. Augustine is a former LockMart executive, and LockMart is a partner in ULA with Boeing, and that ULA maintains a near monopoly over every launch that is not done by NASA, SpaceX, or Orbital Sciences Corp. At the moment SpaceX has yet to fly a launch vehicle from the continental US, OSC has done a few air-dropped Pegasus and former ICBM launches, and if ULA has their way NASA will get out of the space launch business as well. This isn't so much 'commercial space flight' as it is a privatized Air Force and NASA spaceflight program through a sole-source contractor. I have no doubt that if ULA suceeds in getting the Constellation program converted to their launchers then they'll start going after the COTS-D contracts SpaceX and OSC are currently operating under to secure their monopoly.

It is for this reason that I feel strongly NASA needs to retain both a heavy lift component and a crew launch capability. A lot of the rumblings now are about ditching the Ares I, turning crew launch capabilities over to commercial contractors, and pushing forward a solely heavy lift capability with a modified Ares V or Sidemount booster. However, the Ares V's development is far from assured, and the Sidemount involves a lot of development despite its apparent commonality with the current shuttle stack. The Jupiters may require the redesign of the external tank to accomodate a payload above the nose, but the Sidemount requires a redesign for the greater off-center load, and the Ares V scraps the 8.4 meter external tank-based design for a 10 meter design. With any luck if we go with the Direct Jupiters we'll see cargo launches by 2012, and crewed launches by 2014. Even without a Shuttle extension to 2012 or 2013 a two year downtime in the workforce is far more manageable than the 7 year projected downtime for the Ares I.

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Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher

Posted by WillD on Wed Oct 7 01:49:13 2009, in response to Re: GAO recommends against NASA's Ares I launcher, posted by Olog-hai on Tue Oct 6 23:24:08 2009.

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Again I'm forced to ask where exactly that could be read into anything I wrote. It is clear that NASA's current plans to return to the Moon, or even develop a sustainable Shuttle follow-on for a manned presence in LEO were poorly conceived and even more poorly executed. We're facing the prospect of spending the entire budget on the capsule and the two launchers, with no money for the actual missions to land on the moon, or the lunar lander itself. That this is an acceptable course of action to anyone in either Washington or Houston only serves to underscore just how mismanaged the space program has become.

No part of the Direct proposal relies upon components developed or constructed by any European, unless there are outsourced components in the Orion capsule or the Altair lander. The two SRBs will continue to come from ATK in Utah, the SSMEs will come from Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne in California, the core boosters will come from the Michoud assembly plant in Louisiana. The later Jupiter Upper Stage will use J-2X or RL-10 engines, also from Rocketdyne, and likely be assembled alongside the Jupiter core boosters at Michoud.

Indeed, the Direct proposal mirrors the existing plant, but with a slightly scaled down cargo launch vehicle with a scaled up crew launcher. By getting us back into manned spaceflight faster the Direct launcher ensures we do not fall behind the ESA's or JAXO's attempts to turn their current ATV and H-II into manned capsules. The Ares I's 7 year downtime could result in us falling far behind the ESA's crewed capsule.

If you want a proposal that could be heavily involved in the ESA it'd be United Launch Alliance's Delta IV/Atlas V HLV concepts. The launch components would be as American as the other alternatives, but the mission architecture calls for propellant depots in low Earth orbit or at the second Earth/Moon lagrange point. Those propellant depots could be filled by any nation with medium lift space launch capability. Thus the ESA could actually help us reach the moon in return for money or crew to the moon. Given this and the recent news that NASA may need to take on international partners if they insist on sticking with their current plan a staunch xenophobe such as yourself should be waving the Direct banner as your last hope of a Moon return where the mission patch does not feature an EU banner on it.

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