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Posted by
WillD
on Tue Oct 6 00:19:13 2009
edf40wrjww2msgDetailOT:detailStr fiogf49gjkf0d The bad news just keeps piling up for the Bush-era Constellation program. First the Augustine Committee seems to be on the verge of recommending the Ares I crew launch vehicle be deleted and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle be drastically reduced in scale, and now the GAO makes similar recommendations. NASA itself estimates at least half the program cost will go into developing the launcher just to put the crew capsule into low Earth orbit. They haven't even begun developing the Ares V and addressing its many and varied technical issues, which could result in the same cost overruns the Ares I witnessed.
Orlando SentinalNASA's Ares rife with problems, GAO saysCAPE CANAVERAL - Just as supporters are pressing hard on Capitol Hill to resist efforts to kill NASA's AresI rocket and Orion capsule, the investigative arm of Congress released a report saying that NASA has not made a convincing financial case — or even set a firm price — for the space shuttle's replacement.
"While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design challenges have been addressed," says a 31-page Government Accountability Office report released Friday.
And though NASA has said that the development costs of the rocket and capsule will total $35 billion, the GAO estimates they will end up costing as much as $49 billion of the total $97 billion for the Constellation back-to-the-moon program.
The report follows the recently released summary findings of a presidential panel that suggested NASA scrap the Ares I if it wants to continue using the International Space Station and still have a viable human space program, declaring that there is not enough money to do both.
The panel said NASA needed at least $3 billion a year more, on top of its $18 billion budget, to finance a manned space program. Even then, it said, the agency might be better off using commercial rockets rather than Ares I to get to the space station.
President Barack Obama will decide on America's space-exploration strategy after he receives the final report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee next week.
In a three-page response, NASA Deputy Administrator Lori Garver told the GAO that the agency agrees that it needs to develop a better "business case" for the program. But she also seemed to hold out the possibility the program could be killed.
"The agency is working toward closing knowledge gaps about the Constellation program requirements, technologies, funding, schedule and other resources," she wrote, "so that it can be positioned to succeed when decisions are made to commit to significant, long-term investments" in the program.
Some members of Congress, especially on the House Science and Technology Committee, are urging the White House to stay the Constellation course.
Both U.S. Rep. Bart Gordon, D-Tenn., who chairs the House Science and Technology Committee, and his space-subcommittee chair, Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., said the GAO report underscored NASA's need for money.
"The choice is clear: either we give the Constellation program the funding it needs ... or we let our lack of commitment fritter away all that has been accomplished to date," Giffords said in a statement.
However, U.S. Rep. Suzanne Kosmas, D- New Smyrna Beach, acknowledged that "it is clear that there are concerns about the Constellation program that must be fully investigated and addressed." She added she's "confident" the problems can be overcome "with adequate resources."
But the GAO report said problems with Constellation involve more than money. The bleak audit, which ran from last December to last month, depicted a program dogged by technical woes, poor planning and questionable management decisions.
For instance, the report said that because the program's risk-management system warned that Ares I might not be able to meet its March 2015 maiden launch date to the space station, NASA managers stopped work on systems the program would need to go to the moon. Instead, they focused on building a rocket and capsule suited only to ferrying astronauts to the space station — a move many engineers say results in a very expensive trip to low Earth orbit.
NASA said it wanted to ensure Ares I would make its March 2015 date, adding that it could put back the systems needed for the moon later when more money became available. Even so, the GAO found, "these actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that [2015] deadline."
It said the biggest issue facing Constellation was the lack of a "sound business case" — a showing that the program will accomplish its goals at a cost that's understood and agreed upon.
"Progress has been made," the report said. "However, technical and design challenges are still significant, and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program."
As evidence, the report cited NASA's Integrated Risk Management Application, or IRMA, which is how the agency tracks technical challenges. "As of June 9, 2009," it said, "IRMA was tracking 464 risks for Ares I and Orion."
Of these, over 200 were listed as "high" risks — nearly double the total identified by the previous GAO audit in April 2008. Each could have "major effects on system cost, schedule, performance, or safety," the GAO said.
The risks include:
•Ongoing concerns about the rocket violently shaking during its ascent to orbit and uncertainty over whether a proposed system of shock absorbers to counteract the vibrations will work.
•Concerns about design of a second-stage fuel tank, which calls for a bulkhead to separate liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen fuel within the same tank.
•Difficulties in developing a launch-abort system powerful enough to pull the Orion capsule away from the speeding Ares rocket in an emergency.
But the report's main criticism was saved for the financial management of the program. The GAO said it found the cost of Constellation's developmental contracts have risen from $7.2 billion in 2007 to $10.2 billion in June 2009 as NASA sought to resolve technical and design challenges.
In some cases, auditors found that NASA authorized contractors to begin work before reaching final agreement on contract terms. Such work is called "undefinitized."
"By allowing undefinitized contract actions to continue for extended periods, NASA loses its ability to monitor contractor performance" or project remaining costs, the report said. One such contract was allowed to drag on like this for 13 months. This other op/ed piece on the subject from The Space Review is fairly interesting, but IMHO the author's focus on commercial ISS servicing misses the mark. We'll see if SpaceX can get the Falcon 9 to go the right way sometime after November 29th, but before then (not to mention before a Dragon mission) it seems slightly premature to design NASA's post-Shuttle LEO architecture around that system. The Falcon 9H is almost as marginal to boost the Orion capsule as the Ares I, and the same is true of the proposed Delta IVH and proposed Atlas V modifications.
Meanwhile with the directly Shuttle Derived Heavy Lifters, the Not Shuttle-C shuttle modification is gaining ground on the program of record. Unfortunately questions remain about safety, the viability of the early payload shroud jettisoning, and the development of the cargo carrier which could make it extremely difficult complete the project within the budget targets. The Direct architecture is now in its fourth revision, with the SSMEs clustered in the first stage. They are also now illustrating a variant of the launcher with an enormous 12 meter by 37 meter payload fairing. It's unlikely any such fairing would ever be used, but it illustrates the distinct advantage of an inline cryogenic booster over the side-mount and the LOX/RP-1 based Ares V. The former cannot accomodate so large a protrusion from the center of thrust, and the latter is constrained by its lower density fuel requiring a larger core which leaves less space below the VAB door for rollout.
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